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Abstract
This paper investigates the dynamics between the financial freedom counterparts of 
the economic freedom index drawn from the Heritage Foundation database and bank
efficiency levels. We rely on a large sample of commercial banks operating in the 27 
European Union member states over the 2000s. After estimating bank-specific efficiency 
scores using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), we develop a truncated regression model 
combined with bootstrapped confidence intervals to test our main hypotheses. Results 
suggest that the higher the degree of an economy’s financial freedom, the higher the benefits 
for banks in terms of cost advantages and overall efficiency. Our results also show that the 
effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more pronounced in countries with 
freer political systems in which governments formulate and implement sound policies and 
higher quality governance.
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11. Introduction
Recent research in banking is increasingly using the indexes of “economic freedom” 
as explanatory variables in regressions that consider various aspects of bank performance in 
general (e.g., Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004) and bank efficiency specifically (e.g., Chortareas 
et al., 2011). There exists indeed a powerful rational for doing so, and the view that the 
liberty of individuals to pursue their economic goals leads to efficient outcomes is as old as 
the economics science itself. The development of quantitative indexes of economic freedom 
over the last two decades allowed to explicitly analyze the effects of liberal economic 
institutions (or the lack of them) on various aspects of economic performance. Nevertheless, 
in the banking literature the indexes of economics freedom have been used only as control 
variables and/or have been inaccurately interpreted as regulation indexes. Moreover, the 
recent financial crisis revealed fundamental weaknesses in the regulatory framework of 
financial institutions. Different analysts and policymakers attribute the recent travails of the 
financial industry to too little, too much, or inappropriate regulation1 with a consensus being 
formed toward stronger and new forms2 of regulation. An emerging question in the midst of 
this debate is if and how economic and financial freedom may affect the performance of 
financial institutions. 
This paper constitutes the first attempt, to our knowledge, to explicitly characterize 
the effects of “financial freedom” indexes on bank efficiency, controlling for the banking, 
economic, and institutional variables that one typically encounters in financial literature. We 
focus explicitly on the financial counterparts of the economic freedom indexes and we 
distinguish between the concepts of financial freedom and regulation. Our analysis can also 
be interpreted as a robustness check of the constructed freedom indexes themselves. Banks 
                                               
1 For example, recall the failure of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (henceforth, FCIC) to reach a 
consensus and the presence of two dissenting views (FCIC, 2011).
2 E.g., HM Treasury (2010).
2that operate under a high degree of financial freedom and fail to display, ceteris paribus, 
higher levels of productive efficiency would be in contrast with basic tenets of economic 
theory.
We obtain efficiency scores for banks operating in 27 European Union (EU) countries 
using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) over the period 2001-2009, utilizing 6,744 bank 
observations. We then regress the efficiency estimates on the financial/economic freedom 
indexes from the Heritage Foundation (2010), which aim at capturing the “greater 
independence in financial and banking markets from government control”. We employ the 
Simar and Wilson’s (2007) truncated regression model combined with bootstrapped 
confidence intervals and we carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional 
logit estimator. Our analysis controls for bank-specific variables accounting for financial 
strength, relative size of the institutions and a proxy for credit risk. In addition, we consider 
institutional variables to account for government quality.
The rationale for the hypothesized relationship between financial freedom and bank 
efficiency is straightforward: the less are the constraints faced by financial institutions on 
how to manage their business the more effective they should be in controlling their costs, 
thus resulting in a more efficient resources allocation process. Our focus is on the 
commercial banking business rather than on the activities of large complex financial 
institutions. Moreover, our interest is confined explicitly on a specific bank performance 
measure, i.e., productive efficiency. Of course, one could argue that excessive financial 
freedom may contribute to financial institutions’ propensity to take on greater risks, which in 
turn may have contributed to the recent global and European crises. This dimension, 
however, is beyond the scope of the present paper.
No research exists, to our knowledge, focusing explicitly on the effects of financial 
freedom on the productive efficiency of financial institutions. The banking literature typically 
3considers the effects of the regulatory environment of banks (e.g., capital requirements, 
regulatory policies, and banking supervision) on banking system development, banking 
crises, and bank efficiency (this latter is often proxied by accounting ratios, e.g., Barth et al., 
2006). Studies that consider the effects of economic freedom on bank performance typically 
treat the  freedom index as one of the control variables (e.g., Claessens and Laeven, 2004; 
Goddard et al., 2011), and include other aspects of bank performance than efficiency such as 
the interest rate margins (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004). Other relevant research considers 
explicitly bank efficiency focusing on banking reforms and liberalization (e.g., Fries and 
Taci, 2005). Moreover, the existing research typically focuses on the aggregate freedom 
index and not on the specific financial freedom counterparts, which gives rise to the 
possibility of misspecification bias (Heckelman and Stroup, 2000).  
Our results indicate that there is a strong link between financial freedom and bank 
efficiency. In particular, the higher the degree of an economy’s financial freedom, the better 
the banks’ performance is in terms cost advantages and overall efficiency. The evidence also 
suggests that any beneficial effects of financial freedom on bank efficiency tend to be more 
pronounced in countries with freer political systems in which governments formulate and 
implement sound policies and higher quality governance. 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on
the economic and financial freedom indexes and its potential relationship with bank 
efficiency. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology and the data. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Literature review
4Using the economic freedom indexes, extensive empirical evidence has been 
produced focusing on the effect of economic freedom on growth (e.g., De Haan and Sturm,
2000; Gwartney, 2009). Other studies consider the effects of economic freedom on inequality 
(Sala-i-Martin, 2007), income convergence (Xu and Haizheng, 2008), aggregate productive 
efficiency (Adkins et al., 2002), entrepreneurship (Nystrom, 2008), labour markets 
(Feldmann, 2009) and migration flows (Ashby, 2010). Indexes of economic freedom have 
also been used as explanatory variables in financial economics (e.g., Roychoudhury and 
Lawson, 2010) and in characterizing the effects of the recent global recession (Giannone, et. 
al., 2011). 
The empirical literature considering the effects of the economic freedom indexes on 
various aspects of the economy is extensive but a common thread that emerges from the 
evidence is that economies enjoying a high degree of economic freedom can, on balance,
achieve better economic outcomes. In the financial economics and banking literature the 
indexes of economic freedom have been used as control variables in various contexts (e.g.,
Roychoudhury and Lawson, 2010).
Extensive research has been developed over the last two decades gauging financial
institutions’ efficiency using econometric and linear programming techniques.3 The reasons 
for the surge in bank efficiency studies include the changes in the regulatory and operating 
environment which render banks more concerned about controlling their costs while 
optimising revenues. In addition, bank inefficiencies can have direct implications for social 
welfare in the form of deadweight social costs as inefficient banks could price their output 
above marginal social cost, achieving excessive profits. Moreover, in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis, achieving high levels of efficiency on the cost side has become a 
critical factor for the survival of financial institutions. 
                                               
3 For comprehensive survey see Goddard et al. (2001).
5While theoretical models analyzing explicitly the role of economic freedom on bank 
efficiency have not been developed, as far as we are aware, the effects of restrictions on a 
number of aspects of the banking business have been widely analyzed. Flannery (1984), for 
example, considering the restrictions faced by U.S. commercial banks in establishing more 
than one full service office location, observes that constraints preventing free entry to the 
banking industry may force unit banks to operate with a socially inefficient combination of 
inputs. The analysis of banking efficiency has been considered in various contexts, but some 
contributions focus explicitly on the effects of the institutional environment within which 
banks operate (see, among others, Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2004; Barth et al., 2006). Evidence 
suggests that economic, regulatory, and institutional differences play a crucial role in the 
efficient operation of banks, and can explain the discrepancies in efficiency among banking 
sectors in different countries.
Following this path, a number of studies have already included indicators that 
examine the degree of financial liberalisation. La Porta et al. (1998) do not directly account 
for banking sector’s efficiency but include traditional indicators of common law, creditor 
rights, rule of law and find that countries with more robust investor protection (where agency 
costs are restricted by the law) have larger capital markets. The “rule of law” has been also 
used to capture the effects of severe enforcement practices for any given level of creditors or 
shareholders’ protection. In contrast, Fries and Taci (2005) consider the role of banking 
sector reform and liberalization in the transition countries to capture the effect on bank cost 
efficiency. The key explanatory variable of interest is an index of banking sector reform 
published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Transition 
Reports. Their results show that progress in banking reform is significantly associated with a 
decrease in banks’ costs.
6Focusing on the impact of regulatory and supervisory restrictions, Demirguc-Kunt et 
al. (2004) find that regulatory restrictions on banking activities are associated with higher 
level of interest margins. Other studies argue that more openness in the banking markets, in 
terms of increased foreign penetration, reduces bank margins and improvise the efficiency of 
the banking systems (Claessens et al., 2001). Barth et al. (2006) examine bank regulation 
using data from more than 150 countries and conclude that strengthening capital standards or 
empowering supervisors does not boost bank performance, reduce corruption in lending, or 
lower banking system fragility. Other recent studies focusing on the relationship between 
regulatory restrictions and bank efficiency measured with frontier methods include Pasiouras 
et al. (2009). Similarly, evidence produced by Chortareas et al. (2012) indicates that the effect 
of banking regulation and supervision on bank performance appears to change with the type 
of regulation. 
The main rationale for government’s involvement in the financial sector relies on the 
“market failure” approach which postulates that various imperfections prevent competitive 
markets from delivering the most efficient outcomes.4 Information asymmetries (e.g., Stiglitz, 
2002) play an important role among these imperfections. Government intervention is often 
justified in order to prevent the development of monopoly power and excessive risk taking by 
banks (e.g., Freixas and Santomero, 2004). On the other side of this debate stand the views 
that emphasize government failures. Greater independence of banks from government control 
allows the bank boards to be accountable to their shareholders while limited financial 
freedom can distort the incentives of bankers’ boards that are accountable to government 
bodies and strive to meet particular government imposed regulations.
Similar debates have reemerged in the aftermath of the 2007-09 global financial 
crisis on various issues, including regulation, capital requirements, and government 
                                               
4 This rational permeates, for example, the Turner Review (2009), produced by the UK’s Financial Services 
Authority in response to the Chancellor’s of the Exchequer request.  
7interference in the financial industry. One approach points to the deregulation of financial 
services and institutions as a fundamental reason that led to the crisis, while other approaches 
suggest that the seeds of the crisis were sown by a particular set of regulations rather than 
deregulation per se. Moreover, limited financial freedom may have encouraged financial 
institutions to create opaque new instruments and miscalculate risk. The current debate, in the 
context of the European crisis raises issues such whether the eurozone needs further 
centralization of banking supervision leading to a “banking union” with a centralized 
regulator and a eurozone-wide deposit insurance.
Overall, only a relatively limited number of studies use economic freedom indexes
among several other control variables in the analysis of banking efficiency (e.g. Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2004; Chortareas et al., 2011). The main focus of these studies, however, is on the 
banks’ institutional and regulatory environment. To our knowledge, no systematic attempt 
exists to explicitly measure the impact of financial/economic freedom on the efficiency of 
financial institutions and this is the task that we pursue in the following sections.
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data sources
The dataset used in this study is composed of individual bank data sourced from 
unconsolidated statements of banks operating in the 27 European Union member countries, as 
made available through the BankScope database of Bureau van Dijk. We focus on 
commercial banking, which comprises one of the largest segments of depository institutions 
in Europe. To this end, bank holding companies, investment banks and securities houses, 
savings banks, real estate and mortgage banks, non-banking credit institutions, and other 
8specialised governmental credit institutions are excluded from the analysis. The chosen time 
span is 2001 to 2009, avoiding the period of the ongoing European crisis which implies a 
structural break for banks. We have also scrutinized the data to avoid inconsistencies, 
reporting errors, and double counting of institutions. Moreover in order to obtain a relatively 
homogenous dataset and assure credibility of the efficiency indexes, we apply the “Jackstrap” 
methodology.5 Implementing the aforementioned screening methods, results in 6,744 
commercial bank observations. The sample is unbalanced, while the average number of 
observations used is around 750 per year. Table 1 illustrates the number of banks included in 
the sample, as well as their total assets expressed in million euros. 
<Insert Table 1 about here>
Data for the economic freedom are collected from the Heritage Foundation (2010) and 
data on the institutional and governance quality are drawn from the World Bank database by 
Kaufmann et al. (2010). There exist two major attempts to measure economic freedom 
producing the corresponding indexes, namely the Economic Freedom of the World Annual 
Reports produced by the Fraser Institute and the Index of Economic Freedom created by the 
Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal. Both indexes are highly credible and their 
results are compatible in general. While the Economic Freedom of the World has been used 
extensively in the literature, in this paper we use the Heritage Foundation’s Index of 
Economic Freedom for practical purposes because one of its components measures the 
“Finance Freedom.” 
In particular, the Index of Economic Freedom focuses explicitly on the components of 
“financial freedom” (previously dubbed “banking freedom”) while the corresponding 
                                               
5 For more details and application of the “Jackstrap” methodology see, Stosic and Sampaio de Sousa (2003); 
Chortareas et al. (2011).
9counterpart of the Economic Freedom of the World focuses on the “regulation of credit”. The 
two indexes are not identical. A difference highlighted by Heckelman and Stroup (2000) is 
that the Heritage index of Freedom reflects primarily policy variables which are under the 
government’s control while the Fraser index is dominated by outcome variables. The two 
indexes, however, produce consistent overall rankings (e.g., De Haan & Sturm, 2000).
Finally, we should mention that for robustness purposes we have tested the key hypotheses of 
this paper using the Economic Freedom of the World data (albeit for shorter periods) and the 
results point to the same direction as the ones reported below.   
3.2. Measuring bank efficiency: Non-parametric DEA
To examine the impact of economic and financial freedom on bank efficiency, we use 
a two-stage approach. In the first stage, we derive input-oriented non-parametric efficiency 
scores. In the second stage the DEA efficiency scores are regressed against a variety of 
economic freedom and other bank-specific and institutional control variables.
The DEA approach employs a linear programming framework and makes some fairly 
general assumptions about the underlying production technology to yield an estimate of the 
Farrell’s (1957) efficiency measure for each bank in a given sample. The first version of 
DEA (Charnes et al. 1978) assumes constant returns to scale (CRS), i.e. a change in inputs is 
followed by a change in the same proportion of the outputs. In this paper, we employ an 
input-oriented DEA model with variable returns to scale (VRS) developed by Banker et al. 
(1984), i.e. the VRS relaxes the constant returns to scale assumption and allows for the 
possibility that the banks’ production technology may exhibit increasing, constant, or 
10
decreasing returns to scale. In the linear programming problem, the VRS specification adds a 
convexity constraint to the original Charnes et al.’s (1978) model6.
Banks’ efficiencies are measured relative to a common frontier by pooling the data 
across countries estimated separately for each year. This approach allows us to estimate 
efficiency differentials not only between commercial banks within a country but across 
countries as well as using the same benchmark. Accordingly, we adopt the intermediation 
approach, which assumes that banks use deposits, labor and capital to produce loans and 
other earning assets. Selected descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs used in the DEA 
efficiency measurement are presented in Table 2.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
3.3. Economic freedom and bank efficiency 
In the second stage, the efficiency scores serve as the dependent variable in the 
estimation of the following equations: 
kitkiiki YEARBHEFF ,3,21,   (1a)
kitikiiki YEARIBFINFREEEFF ,43,21,         (1b)
    
where i indexes country i , k indexes bank k , iH is a vector of economic freedom indicators 
in country i , kiB , is a vector of bank-specific characteristics for each bank k in country i , iI
is a vector of governance indicators in country i , tYEAR is a yearly dummy variable
                                               
6 The input orientation implies input minimisation while keeping a given output level.
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controlling inter alia for other macroeconomic and technical changes, and ki , is the error 
term. The dependent variable EFF is the managerial efficiency measure, measuring how far 
the bank is from the estimated efficient frontier.7 Equation (1b) includes the financial 
freedom variable (FINFREE), which proxies for banking and financial freedom, and 
additional controls using governance indicators, as constructed by the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank (Kaufmann, et al., 2010) to account for the 
quality of institutional development in each country. The main hypothesis we wish to test is 
whether better governance, as measured by six complementary indexes each one capture a 
different dimension of government quality, may have affected bank efficiency. Thus, we 
want to prevent our indexes of economic freedom capturing the effects of these governance 
and political indicators. 
To estimate equations 1a and 1b we employ the Simar and Wilson (2007) parametric
regression bootstrap, which incorporates the parametric structure and distributional 
assumptions of the equations, to estimate bootstrap confidence intervals for the parameter 
estimates 1 3ˆ  . This is achieved by using 2000 bootstrap replications. As a sensitivity analysis, 
we also estimate equations 1a and 1b using Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) fractional logit 
estimator (discussed below). 
The data for the variables accounting for economic freedom (variables in vector Hi of 
equations 1a and 1b) are obtained from the Heritage Foundation’s (2010) database.
Specifically, we define the vector Hi as follows:
( , , , , , )i i i i i i iH FINFREE GOVERNEXP PROPERTY CORRFREE BUSINESS INDEX        (2)
                                               
7 In other words, this is a relative measure that implies the best-practice banks are by definition one hundred per 
cent efficient, while the others are characterized as inefficient relative to them.
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where FINFREE, is an overall indicator of financial and banking freedom with larger values 
signifying more freedom. This variable has been used as a proxy of the degree of openness of 
the banking industry (see among others, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 2004; Chortareas et al., 2011). 
An open and transparent banking environment facilitates access to financing and encourages 
competition to provide efficient financial intermediation between households, firms, as well 
between and investors and entrepreneurs. 
In order to control for other freedom counterparts and to capture a country’s broader 
environment within which economic activity takes place, the vector Hi also includes the 
following variables from the Heritage foundation: government spending, property rights, 
freedom from corruption and business freedom. High levels of government spending 
(GOVERNEXP) indicate enhanced government involvement in the economy. Higher values 
of the Property Rights index (PROPERTY) indicate a high degree of protection of private 
property rights. Freedom from corruption (CORRFREE) is defined as the failure of integrity 
in the system, a distortion by which individuals are able to gain at the expense of the whole. 
Freedom from corruption is expected to promote equitable treatment and greater regulatory 
efficiency (Miller and Holmes, 2010). The Business Freedom variable (BUSINESS) is a 
proxy of the ability to establish and run a business without interference from the government. 
Burdensome and redundant regulatory rules are the most common barriers to the free conduct 
of business activities. Finally, the economic freedom index variable (INDEX), is an aggregate 
measure of a country’s overall economic freedom from 10 different viewpoints. The 
economic freedom indicators take values in a scale from 0 to 100, where higher values 
indicating an economic environment or set of policies that is most conducive to economic 
freedom.
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The regression specifications in equations 1a and 1b account for bank- specific kiB ,
control variables; while equation 1b further includes country-specific iI institutional control 
variables as a robustness check. The corresponding vectors are defined as follows:
, , , , ,( , , , )i k i k i k i k i kB EQAS ROAE LNTA CR          (3)
( , , , , , )i i i i i i iI VOICE STABILITY GOVERN REG LAW CORR          (4)
The vector, Bi,k, described in equation 3, includes other bank-specific factors that 
might influence the efficiency of a particular bank included in the second-stage regression 
model. The bank-specific variables include the following: (i) level of capitalization, proxied 
by the equity over total assets ratio (EQAS); (ii) profitability, measured by the return on 
average equity (ROAE); (iii) bank size, defined as the logarithm of the bank’s total assets 
(LNTA); and (iv) credit risk, captured by the total loans to assets ratio (CR).    
The vector of institutional control variables, Ii, in the efficiency equation 4 includes 
the following variables from Kaufman et al. (2010) dataset on institutional development: 
voice and accountability (VOICE), political stability (STABILITY), government
effectiveness (GOVERN), regulatory quality (REG), rule of law (LAW) and control of 
corruption (CORR). The six governance indicators are measured in units ranging from about 
-2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. Finally, the set 
of YEAR dummy variables in equations 1a and 1b controls, inter alia, for other 
macroeconomic, regulatory and technological changes in the economy. Table 3 reports the 
descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the model. The Table shows average 
efficiency scores of about 72%, thus suggesting that banks have considerable scope for 
reducing wasted inputs while at the same time increasing desirable output
14
<Insert Table 3 about here>
4. Results
4.1. Financial freedom and bank efficiency
           To consider to what extent economic and financial freedom affect the efficient 
operation of banks, we regress the estimated efficiency scores on economic freedom indexes
along with a selection of bank-specific and institutional variables. Equations 1a and 1b are 
estimated using Simar and Wilson’s (2007) truncated regression model and confidence 
intervals are computed using 2000 bootstrap replications. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the parameter estimates and their bootstrapped confidence 
intervals.  
<Insert Tables 4 and 5 about here>
Each model in Table 4 presents the results derived from alternative economic freedom 
variables while controlling for a selected set of relevant bank-specific variables frequently 
employed in banking studies. In particular, the first column in Table 4 reports the basic 
regression model that includes the financial freedom variable and bank-specific control 
variables (model 1). The next five columns include alternative economic freedom control 
variables one at a time (models 2-6), while the last column (model 7) tests whether all the 
economic freedom variables are significant as a group. Table 5 reports results from 
robustness checks, which consist in incorporating key governance indicators in the 
specification. We start from the basic regression model (model 1) and proceed with further 
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controlling for institutional and bank-specific factors. To avoid problems of multicollinearity 
we include institutional control variables one by one (models 1-6). 
The financial freedom coefficient is positive at the 1% level of statistical significance 
in all models tested. The estimated results reveal strong evidence that a higher degree of 
restrictions and controls in the economy can have a significant role in reducing banks’ 
efficiency scores. These results are broadly in line with recent empirical evidence considering 
the implications of liberalization and reforms in the financial sector (e.g., La Porta et al., 
1998; Fries and Taci, 2005). Indeed, one would expect that when financial intermediaries 
operate in a less restricted environment they may be more likely to engage in competitive 
policies thus achieving higher levels of operating and other efficiencies. As noted above, 
there is not a direct mapping from financial freedom to bank regulation but nevertheless the 
two concepts are closely related. In this sense the results are broadly consistent with recent 
evidence provided by Barth et al. (2006), that greater controls may hinder bank performance.8
Therefore, our evidence broadly suggests that policies that constrain banks’ degree of 
financial freedom may result in an inefficient resources allocation process. This corroborates 
previous findings showing that regulatory restrictions tend to boost interest margins, for 72 
countries around the globe (Demirguc-Kunt, et al., 2004). 
The results also document a strong link between bank efficiency and government 
spending, property rights, freedom from corruption and business freedom. Banks in countries 
where the overall environment is conducive to the protection of the private sector property 
rights and the financial system is characterized by relatively high levels of openness tend to 
have higher efficiency levels. Put it differently, all coefficient estimates for the Heritage 
Foundation variables describing the country’s financial environment indicate a positive and 
statistically significant relationship at the 1% level. Moreover, our results suggest that a 
                                               
8 Efficiency in Barth, et al. (2006), however, is measured with accounting ratios and not with frontier analysis.
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strong negative relationship between government spending and efficiency exists, implying 
that excessive government spending often leads to inefficiency, possibly through the channels 
of bureaucracy, waste, and lower productivity.
Table 5 shows the result from the estimation of equation (1b) which focuses on the 
relationship between efficiency and financial freedom, taking explicitly into account the 
governance and institutional settings. We conduct six regressions used as additional 
robustness checks for the obtained results. We consider the financial freedom along with 
selected institutional environment variables – such as the voice and accountability (VOICE), 
political stability (STABILITY), government effectiveness (GOVERN), regulatory quality 
(REG), rule of law (LAW) and control of corruption (CORR). The obtained results broadly 
corroborate the findings of the regressions based on equation 1a. In general, economic 
freedom and better institutional quality allow for more efficient financial institutions. 
Turning to the bank-specific control variables in Tables 4 and 5, we find that the 
equity over total assets ratio (EQAS) variable has a positive sign. This is not a surprising 
finding and is supported by the literature that is consistent with the argument that higher 
capitalization contributes to alleviating agency problems between managers and shareholders
(Mester, 1996). The effects of profitability and bank size on efficiency are also positive and 
significant in all the alternative specifications considered, suggesting that larger banking 
institutions with higher profitability ratios, benefit substantially banks’ efficiency levels. 
Finally, the total loans to total assets ratio also carries a positive and significant sign, 
indicating that banks with higher proportions of loans may increase the pressures on 
management to effectively deal with credit risk, thus improving the efficiency of the banking 
institutions. It could also imply that banks that are more focused on the traditional banking 
business are on average more efficient.
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The results on the institutional control variables suggest that banks operating under 
more open institutional frameworks are more likely to achieve higher efficiency levels. All 
tested variables are highly significant and positive to varying degrees, being particularly high 
for the variable VOICE – that measures the degree of freedom of expressions and free media 
in a country’s system – and REG, a proxy for regulatory quality. This suggests that more 
developed and democratic systems are conducive to the more efficient operations of financial 
institutions. It also implies that the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies and promote socially desirable investments can enhance the 
efficiency in the industry and economy welfare. The regulatory quality proxy (REG) captures 
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development (Kaufmann et al., 2010). That 
is, this variable indicates good regulation and not more regulation. The index of regulatory 
quality displays a positive but very low correlation with the index of financial freedom and 
displays.
Overall, it appears that economic freedom is a key element of the environment within 
which financial institutions operate. More financial/banking freedom seems to be associated 
with higher efficiency scores in European banking. Furthermore, when controlling for 
institutional development, our results reveal a strong link between the quality of institutions 
and bank efficiency. 
4.2. Sensitivity analysis
      
            For robustness purposes, we re-estimate the second-stage regression models specified 
in equations 1a and 1b using the Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) ‘fractional logit’ estimator. 
The justification for carrying out this additional analysis is based on McDonald (2009) who 
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argues that DEA efficiency is not the outcome of a truncated process but rather the outcome 
of a fractional logit process (it takes values between zero and one) and thus, not a latent 
variable.9  
We report the results in Tables 6 and 7, which overall appear to corroborate the key 
findings reported in Tables 4 and 5. Specifically, we continue to find a positive and 
significantly high effect of economic freedom indexes on banks’ productive efficiency. We 
also find the same relationships when controlling for institutional variables across all models,
indicating that the degree of openness and democratic political systems may have a positive 
effect on bank efficiency.
<Insert Tables 6 and 7 about here>
4.3. Discussion
The financial freedom counterpart of the economic freedom indexes captures the 
“greater independence in financial and banking markets from government control.” This 
definition of financial freedom indexes is closely related to the broad concept of deregulation 
that is, the removal of artificial barriers that prevent entry and/or competition between 
products, markets and institutions. Thus one may expect that the financial freedom 
counterparts of the economic freedom indexes can inversely correlate with the degree of 
regulatory tightness in banking.10 The two concepts, however, are not identical. Financial 
freedom indicates limited government influence/control in financial and banking markets 
and, in addition to the regulatory framework, it takes into account the extent of state 
                                               
9 The application of Papke and Wooldridge’s (1996) quasi-likelihood estimation allows us to cross-check our 
results in case the efficiency estimates are not generated by a truncated data-generating process (DGP), as 
described by Simar and Wilson (2007), but are simply generated by a fractional logit process (McDonald, 2009). 
10 For example, the freedom indexes inversely relate with the measures of activity restrictions and official 
supervisory power provided by Barth et al. (2006). 
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intervention in banks and in the allocation of credit, as well as the possible obstacles in 
opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic and foreign individuals). 
Even the indexes of regulatory quality used in the paper are weakly correlated with the index 
of financial freedom in the same way that are correlated with the corruption and property 
rights components of the overall index. Thus, the interpretation of limited financial freedom 
as bank regulatory restrictiveness would not be appropriate. Regulatory tightness and 
measures of financial freedom can be closely associated but they do not identify with each 
other, either in scope or in terms of measurement. 
Given their scope, the indexes of economic freedom have been criticized of 
incorporating a degree of ideological bias. But even if this is the case, as Ashby and Sobel 
(2008) observe, they measure indeed what they are supposed to measure. In one sense, our 
analysis puts the very consistency of the constructed freedom indexes in the microscope, 
operating as a control for their validity. If banks that enjoy a high degree of 
economic/financial freedom were characterized by poor efficiency performance, ceteris 
paribus for the effects of banking and institutional variables, and under the typical 
assumptions of the neoclassical analytical framework, it would possibly imply flaws in the 
measurement of the freedom index (or in the assumptions underplaying the economic model). 
5. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the existing literature by focusing on the relationship 
between the different components of the economic freedom indexes on the efficient 
operations of banks. Our main focus is on the index of financial freedom that measures an 
economy’s banking system effectiveness as well as independence from government control 
and interference in the financial sector. We first produce DEA efficiency scores for 6,744 
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bank observations operating in 27 European countries between 2001 and 2009. Then, we use 
a robust bootstrap procedure to regress the first-stage efficiency scores on economic freedom 
indexes, while controlling for governance indicators and bank specific characteristics. In 
addition, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for robustness using a fractional logit estimator. 
The results show that a clear positive association between the financial counterparts 
of the economic freedom indexes and the bank efficiency measures exist. This suggests that 
excessive government interference in the financial institutions activities may adversely affect 
the efficient operation of banks. Banks operating in countries characterized by a high degree 
of economic and financial freedom and good governance tend to display relatively higher 
levels of efficiency on the cost side. These imply a more effective management in controlling 
costs while maximising the revenue streams in contexts characterised by policies that 
improve banks’ degree of freedom thus resulting in a more efficient resources allocation 
process. Controlling for these broader, national characteristics, including freedom as captured 
by the freedom indexes, can explain cross-bank differences in terms of efficiency. The recent
global financial crisis has put the discussion regarding governments’ interference in the 
financial system on a new basis. 
Assessing the effects of a free financial and banking environment for financial 
institutions’ efficiency has direct implications in the context of this debate, especially in the 
aftermath of the “Great Recession” and the European crisis, which increase the prominence 
of systemic risk and prompt policymakers to search for new supervisory and macroprudential 
policy frameworks. A further challenge that emerges in our line of research is to consider 
whether “excessive” financial freedom may contribute to financial institutions’ propensity to 
take on greater risks, which in turn may have contributed to the recent global and European 
crises. Given that our focus is on one aspect of bank performance (efficiency) and on 
commercial banking only, this question is beyond the scope of the present paper.
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Table 1.
Time and size distribution of EU-27 banks
Year Number
of obs.
Asset size (€ million)
Mean Median St.Dev.
2001 813 8,907.6 776.8 45,488.1
2002 791 8,657.2 768.3 42,821.8
2003 764 9,939.6 761.2 47,338.7
2004 708 10,368.7 970.2 51,645.9
2005 921 11,522.8 981.4 66,524.2
2006 836 13,157.9 1,174.9 73,641.4
2007 834 14,643.1 1,352.0 84,656.5
2008 765 19,849.5 1,421.3 116,134.0





Bank inputs and outputs (€ million)
Variable Mean St.Dev. Median
2001 2009 2001 2009 2001 2009
Inputs
Personnel expenses 75.5 140.9 350.9 537.6 9.4 17.3
Total Fixed Assets 60.3 90.0 242.6 332.8 6.0 8.8
Interest expenses 379.6 540.3 1,804.8 2,272.4 27.4 34.5
Outputs
Total Loans 3,707.0 9,538.6 16,329.0 32,877.0 296.4 814.8
Total Other Earning Assets 4,107.0 10,997.8 21,975.0 51,797.0 277.6 519.0
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Table 3. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the cross sectional regressions: Mean, 
Median and Standard Deviations for 2001-2009a
Symbol Definition Mean St.Dev. Median
EFF Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) efficiency scores 0.72 0.22 0.73
Economic Freedom Variables
FINFREE Financial Freedom 66.97 15.06 70.00
GOVERNEXP Government Spending 33.32 16.00 31.70
PROPERTY Property Rights 75.38 16.62 70.00
CORRFREE Freedom from Corruption 68.08 17.96 71.00
BUSINESS Business Freedom 77.06 9.98 70.30
INDEX Index of Economic Freedom 67.74 6.43 68.10
Bank-Specific Control Variables
EQAS Shareholder's Equity / Total Assets 10.36 9.23 7.87
ROAE Return on Average Equity 7.93 22.36 8.15
LNTA Logarithm of Total Assets 9.56 3.61 8.44
CR Total Loans / Total Assets 0.50 0.27 0.53
Institutional Control Variables
VOICE Voice and Accountability 1.25 0.27 1.30
STABILITY Political Stability 0.83 0.34 0.82
GOVERN Government Effectiveness 1.35 0.57 1.52
REG Regulatory Quality 1.29 0.37 1.28
LAW Rule of Law 1.25 0.54 1.38
CORR Control of Corruption 1.31 0.70 1.41
    a All financial variables measured in millions Euros. 
      Sources: The Heritage Foundation and Down Jones & Company, Inc., (2010); Governance Matters (Kaufman 
et al., 2010); Bankscope and own calculations.
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                 Table 4. 
              Truncated regression analysis using equation (1a)
Years: 2001-2009
Dep.Var.: EFF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Economic 
Freedom variables
FINFREE 0.001*** - - - - - 0.002***
GOVERNEXP - -0.002*** - - - - -0.002***
PROPERTY - - 0.001*** - - - 0.001
CORRFREE - - - 0.001*** - - -0.000
BUSINESS - - - - 0.002*** - -0.001
INDEX - - - - - 0.003*** -
Bank Specific 
variables
EQAS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001*
ROAE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
LNTA 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035***
CR 0.149*** 0.119*** 0.152*** 0.148*** 0.141*** 0.155*** 0.137***
Constant 0.053*** 0.228*** 0.031*** 0.053*** -0.006*** -0.088** 0.133***
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744
Number of 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Note: FINFREE= Financial Freedom, GOVERNEXP= Government Spending, PROPERTY= Property Rights, CORRFREE= 
Freedom from Corruption, BUSINESS= Business Freedom, INDEX= Index of Economic Freedom, EQAS= Equity/Assets, 
ROAE= Return on Average Equity, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, CR= Total Loans/Total Assets, Constant= constant term.  
Estimation of the models is based on Simar and Wilson (2007), Algorithm 1, using 2000 bootstrap replications for the confidence 
intervals of the estimated coefficients.
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.
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Table 5. 
Truncated regression analysis using equation (1b)
Years: 2001-2009
Dep.Var.: EFF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial 
Freedom variable
FINFREE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
Bank Specific 
variables
EQAS 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001
ROAE 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
LNTA 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036***
CR 0.156*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.154*** 0.153***
Institutional 
variables
VOICE 0.070*** - - - - -
STABILITY - 0.038** - - - -
GOVERN - - 0.033*** - - -
REG - - - 0.050*** - -
LAW - - - - 0.020*** -
CORR - - - - - 0.015***
Constant -0.010*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.019*** 0.034*** 0.037***
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744
Number of 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Note: FINFREE= Financial Freedom, EQAS= Equity/Assets, ROAE= Return on Average Equity, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, 
CR= Total Loans/Total Assets, VOICE= Voice and Accountability, STABILITY= Political Stability, GOVERN= Government 
Effectiveness, REG= Regulatory Quality, LAW= Rule of Law, CORR= Control of Corruption, Constant= constant term.  
Estimation of the models is based on Simar and Wilson (2007), Algorithm 1, using 2000 bootstrap replications for the 
confidence intervals of the estimated coefficients.
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level according to bootstrap confidence intervals.
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Table 6. 
QMLE analysis using equation (1a)
Years: 2001-2009
Dep.Var.: EFF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Economic 
Freedom variables
FINFREE 0.006*** - - - - - 0.007***
GOVERNEXP - -0.005*** - - - - -0.005***
PROPERTY - - 0.005*** - - - 0.003*
CORRFREE - - - 0.005*** - - -0.000
BUSINESS - - - - 0.006*** - -0.004**
INDEX - - - - - 0.014*** -
Bank Specific 
variables
EQAS 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.017***
ROAE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
LNTA 0.177*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 0.176***
CR 0.339*** 0.247*** 0.345*** 0.328*** 0.306*** 0.363*** 0.323***
Constant -2.187*** -1.543*** -2.225*** -2.112*** -2.249*** -2.780*** -1.923***
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744
Number of 
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
Note: FINFREE= Financial Freedom, GOVERNEXP= Government Spending, PROPERTY= Property Rights, CORRFREE= 
Freedom from Corruption, BUSINESS= Business Freedom, INDEX= Index of Economic Freedom, EQAS= Equity/Assets, 
ROAE= Return on Average Equity, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, CR= Total Loans/Total Assets, Constant= constant term.  
Estimated using Papke and Wooldridge (1996) Quasi-Likelihood estimation method. 
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level.
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level.
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level.
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Table 7. 
QMLE analysis using equation (1b)
Years: 2001-2009
Dep.Var.: EFF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial
Freedom variable
FINFREE 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006***
Bank Specific 
variables
EQAS 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016***
ROAE 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
LNTA 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.178*** 0.178***
CR 0.358*** 0.352*** 0.357*** 0.365*** 0.353*** 0.349***
Institutional 
variables
VOICE 0.210*** - - - - -
STABILITY - 0.089** - - - -
GOVERN - - 0.109*** - - -
REG - - - 0.181*** - -
LAW - - - - 0.060** -
CORR - - - - - 0.040**
Constant -2.383*** -2.259*** -2.285*** -2.317*** -2.246*** -2.231***
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744 6744
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Note: FINFREE= Financial Freedom, EQAS= Equity/Assets, ROAE= Return on Average Equity, LNTA= LN of Total Assets, 
CR= Total Loans/Total Assets, VOICE= Voice and Accountability, STABILITY= Political Stability, GOVERN= Government 
Effectiveness, REG= Regulatory Quality, LAW= Rule of Law, CORR= Control of Corruption, Constant= constant term.  
Estimated using Papke and Wooldridge (1996) Quasi-Likelihood estimation method. 
*p<0.1 Significance from zero at the 10% level.
**p<0.05 Significance from zero at the 5% level.
***p<0.01 Significance from zero at the 1% level.
